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Abstract 
When products fail in the field, disasters can result. To head off problems, manufacturers must build 
reliability into the design of products and processes. Statistics can be used proactively to help improve 
reliability during product design and development and enable manufacturers to “do it right the first time.” 
The authors describe some technical and statistical problems from four specific reliability disasters to 
highlight lessons learned. 
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Reliability evaluations present a challenge for manufac-
turers and consumers because there is an elapsed time 
between when the product is designed and built, and when 
the reliability information is forthcoming. 
For instance, the manufacturer of a newly designed car 
might have only three years to demonstrate its reliability 
before it is brought to market. But you might want to know, 
for example, whether—if the car is properly cared for—it will 
provide trouble-free service for the next 12 years or if it is 
going to lead to mounting problems after just a few years. 
The desire for high reliability is not new. Throughout history, 
people learned from their successes and mistakes, for exam-
ple, in building durable wheels, larger domes, stronger ships 
and longer bridges. The learnings from disasters, such as the 
Titanic sinking, the de Havilland DH 106 aircraft crash and the 
Tacoma Narrows Bridge collapse, can help achieve improved 
reliability and safety of subsequent generations of products.1
In the past, reliability assurance was often an afterthought— 
even in organizations that emphasized quality. This is sometimes 
referred to as the “design, build, test and fix” approach. 
Using this approach meant that manufacturers discovered 
and addressed reliability issues through extensive testing 
after the product already had been designed. 
Sometimes, the time allotted for such testing did not allow 
all important failure modes to be identified and fixed, and the 
product was released before its reliability was fully validated. 
There was a heavy reliance on end-of-line product testing and 
fixing problems in the field after they occurred. As a result, 
much effort was spent responding to crises and fixing prob-
lems after they already had created damage to the customer 
and the manufacturer’s reputation.
In large part in response to increased competition in the 
world markets, starting about 30 years ago, forward-looking 
business and industry leaders have realized that achieving 
reliability by reactive measures is unacceptably expensive 
and potentially disastrous to retaining customer confidence. 
If reliability problems arise after a product has been released 
for production and, especially if units in the field must be 
recalled for retrofitting, costs can be severe and may rapidly 
dwarf a product’s profit margin. 
There is now general agreement that reliability must be 
built into the design of products and processes proactively. 
Problems discovered in design—though often more difficult 
to identify, are usually less costly and much easier to fix. 
Problems found after the design has been frozen—and espe-
cially after significant quantities have been built, although easy 
to identify, are often difficult and expensive to fix. 
As a result, the traditional design, build, test and fix approach 
has been replaced—at least in the minds of most reliability 
practitioners—by a “do it right the first time” mindset or proac-
tive reliability assurance. 
Focus on proactive reliability assurance has led to using 
statistics to help improve reliability during product design and 
development. This requires quantitative methods for predict-
ing and assessing product reliability, and for providing early 
information on failure causes, as well as—and perhaps most 
importantly—careful planning to ensure the most meaningful 
information for analysis is obtained. 
Many companies, indeed, have incorporated proactive 
approaches and methods into their reliability assurance 
efforts. Despite all of this, however, reliability disasters still 
occur, as evidenced by the frequent media reports concerning 
reliability problems affecting such products as laptop com-
puters, electronic tablets, automobiles and batteries. Recently, 
the Boeing 737 Max airplane disaster has made the headlines. 
So what are we still doing wrong? 
The problem is surely not with the concept of proactive reliabil-
ity assurance, but in the manner in which it has been applied, 
or, in some cases, not applied. What can we learn from various 
past reliability disasters to avoid similar ones in the future?
The past shortcomings have been managerial and technical. 
The former, such as the Boeing 737 Max reliability disaster, 
once uncovered, are typically reported in the mainstream 
press.2 Reliability disasters frequently are related to problems 
in communication, especially to management, and are often 
brought on by pressure to expedite product launch—even if 
the needed information for reliability assurance is not forth-
coming. In contrast, technical deficiencies that contributed 
to reliability disasters, such as inadequate testing, typically 
receive much less press. 
This article focuses on such technical (and statistical) 
problems and highlights key technical lessons learned from 
four specific reliability disasters—as gathered from the pub-
licly available sources referenced. Although some examples 
deal with events that preceded the acceptance of proactive 
reliability assurance, the basic lesson learned still applies. 
In particular, the focus will be on the bulwark of modern 
proactive reliability assurance, the accelerated life test (ALT) 
and the ALT process.
Accelerated life testing 
Statistically planned investigations often can be used during 
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Plots of number of field joint O-ring failures per 
flight vs. launch temperature on previous flights
Note: (a) excludes flights with no failures. (b) includes flights with no failures. The labels on the 
points indicate flight numbers. These figures were adapted from the 1986 Rogers Commission 
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for components, assemblies, subsystems and, eventually, 
the final product or system when there is insufficient time to 
make such evaluations at normal operating conditions. An ALT 
involves running sample product under carefully chosen, more 
severe environments, such as higher temperature or humid-
ity, than would be experienced under normal field operating 
conditions. It also may involve exposing test units to increased 
stress, such as higher voltage or pressure. Such variables 
accelerate the physical and chemical degradation processes 
that cause certain failure modes and result in failures sooner 
than in normal operation. 
When there is a well-understood failure mode (or modes), 
a carefully planned ALT often can provide useful informa-
tion about how that mode will affect product life in the field. 
In particular, a physically appropriate model that relates stress 
to lifetime is fitted statistically to the data from the ALT and 
used to extrapolate to estimate expected lifetime under the 
conditions encountered in normal operation.3 
ALTs have been used for a long time. They have achieved 
a particularly prominent role with the emergence of proactive 
reliability assurance. They can, however, also lead to incorrect 
conclusions if not used with great care.
Identify key failure modes ASAP
The AT&T round cell (a.k.a. “Bell Cell”) was a radical new 
design of a lead-acid battery developed at AT&T Bell Labora-
tories in the late 1960s and deployed in the field in the early 
1970s.4 The round cell was designed as part of a backup power 
source for uninterruptible power supply applications. Plate 
growth is the well-known life-limiting failure mode of a lead-
acid battery cell. 
An ALT used elevated temperature to increase the rate of 
plate growth and predicted extremely long lifetimes (hundreds 
of years) for that part of the system.5 Another ALT for the same 
cell used elevated voltage to accelerate a known corrosion 
mechanism associated with the post seal and predicted the 
post seal would last at least 40 years in service.6 Encouraged 
by these findings, hundreds of thousands of units were installed 
in the field during the 1970s.
Within a few years after the product was introduced into 
the field, however, a serious blister corrosion failure mode 
arose and caused many installed cells to fail. Subsequent 
investigations revealed that the root cause for these failures 
was incompatibility between an epoxy used in a seal of the 
positive post and the lead-acid chemistry. The epoxy was 
redesigned for future production, but a large proportion of 
the previously installed cells needed to be replaced.
The blister corrosion phenomenon was not observed in the 
ALT because the elevated voltage actually inhibited this failure 
mode.7 Blister corrosion was, in fact, an unanticipated failure 
mode. As a result, it had not been properly excited in the ALT. 
The AT&T round cell thus demonstrates it is crucial that all 
relevant failure modes are identified early in the design pro-
cess and thoroughly studied by an appropriately planned ALT. 
Obtain and report all relevant data
The introduction of rotary compressors in General Electric 
(GE) refrigerators provides an enlightening example in which 
highly relevant additional findings from an ALT, although 
recorded, were not given the attention they merited.8 
GE Appliances was losing market share to competitors.9 
The corporation was under intense pressure to bring new 
products to market to turn business around. 
To meet the challenge, GE engineers proposed building 
a new refrigerator with a rotary compressor to replace the 
reciprocating compressor in use at that time. Rotary compres-
sors had been used successfully in air conditioners but not in 
refrigerators. The new refrigerator would have higher effi-
ciency and lower cost than the current refrigerators. 
A sample of 600 rotary compressors was run continuously 
in an ALT at various elevated temperatures. None of the units 
failed after one year of testing. Thus, it was decided to pro-
ceed to launch the product. By 1987, there were more than a 
million units in service. The first compressor failures occurred 
after 1.5 years in field service, and many more failures took 
place shortly thereafter.
It soon became evident that all of the refrigerators that 
had been sold would have premature compressor failures. 
As a result, GE replaced the compressors in all refrigerators 
that it could locate at an estimated total cost of more than 
$450 million.
What is the explanation for the inconsistency in the results 
from the ALT and the actual field performance? The respon-
sible engineers took the prudent step of disassembling some 
of the units that had not yet failed from the ALT.10 In so doing, 
they uncovered multiple early signs of problems with the new 
compressors, such as unexpected discoloration, providing evi-
dence of a lubrication issue and suggesting these units were 
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However, this information did not seem to 
have been properly communicated through 
the management chain—perhaps at least in part—
because of the pressure felt throughout the business 
to adhere to a tight schedule for product launch.
Ensure proper data analysis
The Challenger Space Shuttle was scheduled for launch early 
Jan. 28, 1986. According to the Rogers Commission that 
subsequently investigated the failed launch, on the evening 
of January 27, engineers and managers from NASA and NASA’s 
contractor, Morton Thiokol, discussed during a three-hour 
teleconference the risk posed to the next morning’s planned 
launch.11 The temperature at launch was predicted to be 30° F. 
This low of a temperature was believed by some to increase the 
risk of failure of the O-rings that were used in critical joints of 
the solid rocket motor during launch. Most of the 24 previous 
launches had been held at temperatures between 65° F and 
77° F, with the lowest at 54° F. 
According to the Rogers report, based on analysis of the 
data that was discussed in the meeting on O-ring failures 
during past launches (see subsequent discussion), NASA man-
agement concluded that the probability of launch failure was 
about one in 100,000 (engineering estimates were one in 100). 
Based on this evaluation, and despite a strong recommenda-
tion not to launch from some of its engineers, Morton Thiokol 
acquiesced, and the launch proceeded the next morning. 
A subsequent review, described in the Roger Commission 
report, determined that the prelaunch analysis of the available 
O-ring data, as presented to management, was inadequate 
and erroneous. There was only a hand-written list of the dates 
of O-ring failures, the number of such failures and the tem-
perature. No plots of the data were presented. 
Most importantly, the analysis ignored information from the 
18 previous launches for which there were no O-ring failures. 
In particular, analyses omitting this information provided no 
clear evidence of a relationship between temperature and 
O-ring failure. However, when the data on the launches with-
out any O-ring failures are correctly included in the analysis, 
a strong association between temperature and O-ring failure 
probability was evident. See Figure 1 (p. 41), adapted from 
plots in the Rogers Commission report.
In particular, Figure 1 (a) is a plot of the number of failures 
per flight versus launch temperature for previous launches 
excluding the flights with no failures. This limited data plot 
shows no clear evidence of a relationship between temperature 
and O-ring failure. Figure 1 (b) shows all the data, including the 
flights with no failures. This plot suggests a strong association 
between temperature and number of O-ring failures, with low 
temperatures being particularly risky.
There were two O-rings at each of six field joints in the 
space shuttle’s solid rocket motors. If only one of these 
O-rings failed at any location, it would not be a problem. 
If both failed at one location, it would be catastrophic. In the 
Jan. 28, 1986 Challenger launch, both O-rings failed in one of 
the field joints. A subsequent careful statistical analysis of all 
the available data,12 taking the preceding system structure into 
consideration, estimated the risk of failure for a 31° F launch to 
have been at least one in eight.
The Challenger Space Shuttle disaster was, at least in part, 
attributable to obtaining insufficient data and not paying 
enough attention to the data that were available. It also illus-
trated the usefulness of appropriate plots of the data and the 
fact that statistical analyses of reliability data typically call for 
the use of advanced statistical methods that generally are not 
taught in introductory statistics courses. 
Finally, this application highlights the importance of the skills 
engineers and statisticians must possess to communicate com-
plex technical matters to upper-level management. 
Conduct up-front experimentation
The background for this example comes from the U.S. National 
Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA)13 report 
addressing this disaster. In the late 1990s, reports of tire tread 
separation of Firestone tires on Ford Explorer SUVs started 
to arise and rapidly multiplied. This was of major concern to 
Ford and Firestone because tread and belt separation (TBS) 
failures at high speeds often cause vehicle roll-over accidents, 
resulting in injuries and fatalities. 
In August 2000, 14.4 million potentially vulnerable Ford 
Explorer Firestone tires were recalled. A team of Ford and 
Firestone engineers and statisticians was commissioned to 
scrupulously investigate the problem and recommend action 
to ensure its elimination in future tires.
Systems must be in place to 
carefully monitor field data by 
appropriate segments for timely 
detection of potential issues that may 
affect a subset of the product population.
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Beware of too much extrap-
olation. It is nearly impossible to 
avoid some extrapolation in making 
decisions leading to a new product launch. 
Therefore, manufacturers must continue to collect 
and monitor reliability data through in-house testing 
and exposure of early production units to the harshest 
field conditions.
Carefully track field reliability data. The field provides the 
ultimate testing ground and yields the most realistic, though 
not the timeliest, information about reliability and product 
performance. The worst situation is when a customer is the 
first to bring a problem to a manufacturer’s attention. 
Systems must be in place to carefully monitor field data 
by appropriate segments (for example, manufacturing period, 
product age, use conditions and component vendor) for timely 
(especially important) detection of potential issues that may 
affect a subset of the product population. 
EDITOR’S NOTE
The references listed in this article can be found on the article’s webpage 
at qualityprogress.com.
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A combination of field failure data and physical understand-
ing of TBS failures led the investigatory team to conjecture 
that the failures were affected by such factors as tire inflation 
pressure, radial load, ambient air temperature, the adhesion 
strength between belts and the thickness of the rubber wedge 
between a tire’s belts. 
However, unequivocal conclusions could not be drawn from 
the available observational data. Thus, Ford conducted a large 
experiment to study the effect of these and other factors. The 
experimenters were able to reproduce the field failures in the 
lab, estimate the effects of the different experimental factors 
and identify the root causes: The Firestone tires produced at 
several of their plants had—as a result of a change in spec-
ifications—a narrower inter-belt gauge and less adhesion 
strength than tires from other manufacturers. 
According to the NHTSA report, this knowledge resulted in 
Firestone resetting its manufacturing specifications to what 
they had been originally to avoid such failures in the future. 
Moreover, a key lesson learned from this experience is the 
importance of conducting probing up-front experimentation 
to understand the effect of proposed design changes—and, 
for that matter, original design factors—on product reliability 
and performance. 
If such experimentation had been conducted in this appli-
cation before relaxing specifications (instead of after the 
problems had been discovered), the large direct and indirect 
associated costs would, most likely, have been identified 
and avoided.
Further key points to remember
The preceding examples illustrate only a few key points to 
remember in proactive reliability assurance. But there are 
other major considerations and common pitfalls of ALTs to 
keep in mind.14,15 
Strive to obtain and use degradation data. Meaningful 
product degradation data can provide important clues into 
failure mechanisms even when few—and sometimes even no—
failures are observed in product life testing.16,17 
Search for the best possible physical model. Many reli-
ability problems are caused by unanticipated failure modes 
or known failure modes that are accelerated in an ALT by 
unanticipated or poorly understood environmental condi-
tions. Thus, statistical analyses of reliability data must be 
well-grounded on physical considerations.
Use different credible approaches for analysis and com-
pare the results. A useful practice is to analyze the same data 
under different assumptions and credible models, and per-
haps using different methods. This is particularly relevant for 
new technologies lacking well-established reliability models. 
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